Policy Flexibility and Codition Size

The Case of Israel’s Ruling Party

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.64166/y7s1wp41

Abstract

On the basis of the deductive theories of political coalitions in a modified form, a comparison is drawn between three types of coalitions that have been formed over the years in Israel: minimal, oversized and grand coalitions. From this comparison it is concluded that as regards size, the present Likud-led minimal winning coalition that was formed after the October 1981 elections, has more space to maneuver on policy matter than governments that rest on other possible size configurations. Israel’s policy position has been less dependent on coalitionary politics than on the personal stands and aspirations of its leaders.

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Published

1983-06-01

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How to Cite

Doron, G. (1983). Policy Flexibility and Codition Size : The Case of Israel’s Ruling Party. Israel Social Science Research, 1(2), 57-68. https://doi.org/10.64166/y7s1wp41